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FOREWORD
One lesson of the post-World War II period is that international trade, what-
ever the situation may have been before, is required to serve national, as well as
entrepreneurial, ends. In other words, trade is an instrument of national policy-
obviously so for the state-trading nations, but probably equally so for such nations
as the United States, the last bastion of professed adherence to the doctrines of
classical economics. Trade is manipulated to the extent considered necessary to
serve certain non-commerical and non-economic ends. These may be political, such
as the recent measures taken by the American government against Cuba; or they may
be strategic, the statutory limitations upon trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc being
an example. In addition, there is a range of policies designed to further such
domestic goals as protection of the business enterprise and job opportunities (e.g., the
Buy American legislation and the recently promulgated multilateral textile agree-
ment), income security of the farmers (evidenced by the GATT waiver in 1955
through the operation of which the United States may impose import restrictions
on agricultural products), and maintenance of the mobilization base for national
security (e.g., the restrictions on petroleum imports). Tariffs, of course, are another
important governmental intervention. The result is a pervasive system of uni-
lateral and multilateral controls and prohibitions which clearly evidences that trade
is indeed an instrument of American foreign economic policy. (The same con-
clusion is valid for other nations.) By and large, accordingly, it may be said that
the state intervenes in privately conducted trade transactions to the extent deemed
necessary to further the over-all goals of the American people. "In this matter of
trade," an observer asserted a decade ago, "the most significant fact to be grasped
is the great and growing importance of the state as a directing and organizing
power in economic life and the consequent predominance of state policies and
interests in the economic field."' That comment is as valid for the United States
as for any other nation. Adam Smith maintained that "defense is more important
than opulence"--and, accordingly, would permit variations from free trade for
security purposes; what the United States hopes to achieve through intervention
in trade is both defense and opulence.
'Webb, The Future of International Trade, 5 WORLD POLITICs 423, 435 (i953). See Miller, Foreign
Trade and the "Security State": A Study in Conflicting National Policies, 7 J. Put. L. 37 (1958).
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Among those interests now considered important by the United States, and other
industrialized nations, is improvement in the economic well-being of the peoples of
what are now called the "developing" nations However phrased, it seems to be an
accepted tenet of policy to take measures designed to ameliorate the bleak poverty
of the former colonial areas. Such an acceptance of responsibility stands in marked
contrast to the historical relationship between the industrialized West and the raw
material producers. The reasons for this change are doubtless multiple. Not the least
of them is the need to counteract penetration by Soviet Russia, a principal battle-
ground of the Cold War being the develbping nations. "As far as the United States is
concerned, the central issue with respect to trade is how it affects the relative power
positions of the several national states."'  No doubt there are reasons in addition
to the Cold War imperatives. Even so, it is against the background of the political
and strategic necessities of the era that the question of international commodity agree-
ments may profitably be viewed.
So far as the facts of the situation are concerned, there is little dispute. As is
either explicit or implicit in the articles in this symposium by Professors Gerhard,
Mikesell, and Schmidt, the bedrock fact is that the economic terms of trade have
been, and are, running strongly against the nations with economies based largely
on primary products. In addition, it is fair to say that few commentators seriously
challenge the view that international trade, as it has been carried on, tends to further
the ends of the economically strong-the industrialized nations, mainly of the
,Western bloc-with the result that the rich tend to get richer, both absolutely and
vis-A-vis the poorer nations.4 Furthermore, some sort of consensus exists that
extraordinary measures are necessary, measures taken by the rich powers, to improve
.the material lot of the poverty-rows of the world. Those measures may be said to
be extraordinary in the sense that they involve some sort of tinkering with the market.
Those who consume the primary products are called upon to help those who produce
them.
What is under dispute, and the subject of sharp challenge and controversy, is
what should be done about the problem of economic growth. Agreement that a
problem exists and that something should be done about it is mainly on the level
of abstract principle. Far less agreement exists on the "solution" to the problem.
(Most observers assume that some sort of reasonable solution will be forthcoming,
although one may perhaps be permitted some expression of pessimism on that
The human penchant for euphemism has changed the label during the past several years from
"backward" to "underdeveloped" to "less developed", and now to "developing." Perhaps this is an
instance of the power of words: if the label is changed, then what it symbolizes may, for some of the
more primitive minds, also be altered. If so, then it is appropriate to say that examples of such
primitive minds may be found in even the most highly ddveloped nations.
8 JAmns R. SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NAMIONAL SECURITY 135 (i96o).
'Compare, among others, GUNNAR MYnDAL, Ricri LANDS AND POOR (958) with BARBARA WARD, TH,
RICH NATIONS AND THE Pooa NATIONS (1962) and SIDNEY DELL, TRADE BLoCs AND COMMON MARMTRS
(1963).
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score) International commodity agreements are one of the "solutions" which
have received wide attention in the post-war period. While relatively few have been
negotiated and put into effect, in 1962 some eighteen commodities were reported
as being "under consultation and study": cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, grains, hard
fibres, jute, lead and zinc, olive oil, petroleum, rice, rubber, sugar, tin, tungsten, wheat,
and wool.' "Study groups," established for the purpose of inquiring into certain
products to determine whether a formal agreement would be useful, were in
operation in 1962 for cocoa, coffee, cotton, lead and zinc, rubber, and wool. (The
coffee agreement, signed in 1962, is now provisionally in force; it is the subject of Mr.
Bilder's comprehensive analysis in this symposium.) Trade in primary commodities
is of great importance: "By the end of the nineteen-fifties, total international trade,
excluding trade among the centrally planned economies, was of the order of $ioo
billion. Of this, world trade in primary commodities amounted to somewhat less
than half."7 As Dr. Walker notes in his article in this symposium, President Kennedy
has recently indicated that the United States would be willing to move ahead and
enter into other agreements designed, as is the coffee agreement, to stabilize the
prices of other commodities.
In terms of public law, the agreements are noteworthy for several reasons. First,
what is involved is a significant example of economic planning conducted on a larger
than national scale. However, it is not a systematic attempt to plan; rather, the
agreements seem to be expedients, taken in an ad hoc fashion for each of the com-
modities involved, expedients which hopefully will help the primary producers to
bridge the gap between an agricultural economy and developing industrialization s
They have been called governmental cartels. Certainly they are official interventions
in agricultural (and other) problems of the same type that have become familiar
in recent years in domestic affairs. And they raise problems similar to those oc-
casioned by domestic economic planning, not the least of which may be an inability
to reconcile the conflicting goals of national planning (as in agriculture and in full
employment policies) and multinational planning (as in commodity agreements)."
Second, to some limited extent at least, the agreements are exercises in supranational-
'There are no easy economic solutions. As Schlesinger, op. cit. supra note 3, at 265, puts it: ". . . such
hopes are illusory. It is typical of the American attitude, cultivated as it has been in isolation and
based on the premises of liberalism, to believe that any problem has a solution, and that the basis of
the solution is usually economic."
' The list is taken from the UN publication, z963 Review of International Commodity Problems, p. 2,
issued by the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements (Economic and
Social Council, Document E/3731, May 14, 1963, mimeographed).
*The quotation comes from the UN publication, International Compensation for Fluctuations in
Commodity Trade, Report by a Committee of Experts Appointed by the Secretary General, p. 3 (E/ 3 4 47,
E/CN. 13/40) (Pub. Sales No.: 61.I.D.3 ) (196i).
'The justification for the American use of commodity agreements may be found in Blumenthal, Inter-
national Commodity Problems, 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 997 (1962); Blumenthal, The Economic
Situation and Outlook, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 840 (i962); Blumenthal, U.N. Conference Opens in New
York, 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 234 (1962); Blumenthal, Commodity Stabilization and Economic Develop-
ment in Africa, 47 DE'T STATE BuLL. 616 (5962).
0 Cf. GuNNAR. MvAL, B , YoNm THE WELFARE STATE (1959).
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ism. Their administration is in the hands of "councils" made up of representatives
of both the producing and the consuming nations. In a small way these councils
seem to be able to operate on a level rather higher than the purely national. In
addition, as instances of international administration, they are of interest to students
of constitutional and administrative law. Third, as Dr. Walker shows in his
article, the negotiation and administration of these agreements have important conse-
quences in international law. Finally, there are domestic ramifications, not only
in the economic sense of the higher prices for some of the commodities which must be
paid by the consuming nations, but also with respect to the internal political
situation. The article by Professor Berman and Mr. Heineman discusses one such
internal effect involving the attempt to control sugar.
These are important questions and important problems. However, it is the
economic problems brought about by the limited greater-than-national economic
planning that produce the greatest difficulties, as the articles by Professors Mikesell,
Gerhard, and Schmidt indicate. Together, these articles show that decisions, perhaps
taken mainly for political and military reasons, cannot escape economic consequences.
The gist of the message of the three authors is that the agreements at best may be
nothing more than temporary sedatives or palliatives, possibly productive of adverse
effects in the long run for both the producers and the consumers. Such an attenuated
form of governmental intervention in transnational economic affairs does not seem
to be particularly promising.
If that be so, why, then, are international commodity agreements used? And
what is the alternative? As suggested above, the short answer to the first question
is that there are important strategic and political considerations lying behind them,
at least so far as the United States is concerned. These considerations include not
only the desire that governments of the developing nations should be oriented toward
the Western bloc, important as that may be. Also involved is the basic fact that the
producer nations involved are the sources of raw materials (as well as markets for
manufactured goods) considered vital to the economic well-being of the industrialized
Metropolis. Perhaps certain moral overtones may also be present; leaders in the rich
nations can no longer be blind to the explosive social conditions in the developing
nations,' ° and it is possible to envelop policies taken for more hard-headed reasons
in the garb of altruism. Finally, change is in the air and it is incumbent upon those
who do not want to be inundated by that change to try to manage it;" commodity
agreements are thus an attempt to manage and direct change by the leaders of the
Western bloc in cooperation with the leaders of the developing nations. They are
segments of the foreign aid programs of the United States and its allies.
loSee BARBARA WARD, THE RicI NATIONS AND THE PooR NATIONS (x962). An analogy might be
drawn to the present-day domestic turmoil over the position of the Negro in American society, no longer
can national leaders, executive or legislative, dismiss the problem with a gesture or two.
"
1 As Raul Prebisch, the Latin-American economist and diplomat put it: "It is no longer a question
of whether or not . . . changes will take place, but of who will make them, by what methods and
under what political philosophies." Quoted in Da., op. cit. supra note 4, at 134.
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The alternative to the agreements is not a reversion to "free trade" or the absence
of intervention and multinational regulation. Clearly, some controls are needed.
But a little bit of control, as with the commodity agreements, does not seem to be
enough. The critical questions are: How much is enough, and in what form? The
answers to those questions must come from an evaluation based on more than purely
economic criteria. But economic considerations are not irrelevant and cannot be
ignored; if the commodities do not make sense economically, it is not likely that they
will politically or strategically either. As Boris C. Swerling has put it, "What is
under test is the viability and flexibility of the liberal institutions of Western civiliza-
tion."' 2 The purpose of this symposium is to ventilate some of the problems in-
volved in the use of international commodity agreements as a technique of interna-
tional economic planning. No attempt has been made to propose alternatives, for
surely such an inquiry would involve a far greater endeavor. If, as Dr. Karl Brandt
asserts, commodity agreements "are not the answer," no one yet has produced a
better one. Brandt goes on to maintain that "it is high time that the Western
industrial powers close ranks and coordinate their policies."'" The dialogue over
what those policies should be, particularly toward the developing nations, is in full
swing. Our modest hope for this symposium is that it is a contribution to that
dialogue.
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